Archivio per 21 aprile 2012

21
Apr
12

Social Preferences and Bounded Rationality in the Centipede Game

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

Jeremy Tremewan (Vienna) presented an interesting seminar on his research (with co-authors) into social preferences and strategic behaviour in the centipede game. Eliciting detailed information on beliefs about opponents’ behaviour his research/experiment shows that contrary to many other findings subjects continue longer in the centipede game in outgroup scenarios vs ingroup scenarios. A prospective reference theory (Viscusi) model is used to help organise and understand this puzzling behaviour – with a bounded rationality explanation: subjects in outgroup treatments treat their beliefs as only partially informative and discount them more highly than do subjects in ingroup treatments (conditional on the PRT model being valid). A lively discussion with many interesting comments.

See on vimeo.com

Annunci



Time is real? I think not

aprile: 2012
L M M G V S D
« Mar   Mag »
 1
2345678
9101112131415
16171819202122
23242526272829
30  

Commenti recenti

Lorenzo Bosio su Un testo che trascende le sue…

Inserisci il tuo indirizzo e-mail per iscriverti a questo blog e ricevere notifiche di nuovi messaggi per e-mail.

Segui assieme ad altri 1.044 follower

Latest Tweets

Annunci

%d blogger hanno fatto clic su Mi Piace per questo: