Archivio per 23 giugno 2012

23
Giu
12

Economics and psychology.Perfect rationality versus bounded rationality – Munich Personal RePEc Archive

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

Classical mathematical algorithms often fail to identify in time when the international financial crises occur although, as the classical theory of choice would suggest, the economic agents are rational and the markets are or should be efficient and behave also rationally. This contribution does not pretend to give a complete answer to these questions, but it will highlight some well-known limits of the classical theory of rational choice and compare this theory of choice with the approach that seeks to combine economics and psychology and that has established itself as cognitive or behavioral economics. In particular, the present paper will focus on the juxtaposition of the concepts of perfect rationality and bounded rationality. It concludes with some references to the literature of behavioral finance which has given important contributions in explaining the behavior and the anomalies of financial markets.

See on mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de

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23
Giu
12

Behavioral Economics by Erik Angner, George Loewenstein :: SSRN

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

Behavioral economics is the effort to increase the explanatory and predictive power of economic theory by providing it with more psychologically plausible foundations. Behavioral economics, which recently emerged as a bona fide subdiscipline of economics, raises a number of questions of a philosophical, methodological, and historical nature. This chapter offers a survey of behavioral economics, including its historical origins, results, and methods; its relationship to neighboring fields; and its philosophical and methodological underpinnings. Our central thesis is that the development of behavioral economics in important respects parallels the development of cognitive science. Both fields are based on a repudiation of the positivist methodological strictures that were in place at their founding and a belief in the legitimacy of making reference to unobservable entities such as beliefs, emotions, and heuristics. And both fields adopt an interdisciplinary approach, admitting evidence of many kinds and using a variety of methods to generate such evidence. Moreover, there are in fact more direct links between the two fields. The single most important source of inspiration for behavioral economists has been behavioral decision research, which can in turn be seen as an integration of ideas from cognitive science and economics. Exploring the parallels between the two endeavors, we attempt to show, can shed light on the historical origins of, and the specific form taken by, behavioral economics.

See on papers.ssrn.com

23
Giu
12

Darwin’s Mind: The Evolutionary Foundations of Heuristics and Biases by James Montier :: SSRN

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

The catalogue of biases that cognitive psychologists have built up over the last three decades seem to have stem from one of three roots – selfdeception, heuristic simplification (including affect), and social interaction. This paper attempts to explore the evolutionary basis of each of these roots. The simple truth is that we aren’t adapted to face the world as it is today. We evolved in a very different environment, and it is that ancestral evolutionary environment that governs the way in which we think and feel. We can learn to push our minds into alternative ways of thinking, but it isn’t easy as we have to overcome the limits to learning posed by self-deception. In addition, we need to practice the reframing o

See on papers.ssrn.com

23
Giu
12

Option Traders Use (very) Sophisticated Heuristics, Never the Black–Scholes–Merton Formula by Espen Haug, Nassim Taleb :: SSRN

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

Option traders use a heuristically derived pricing formula which they adapt by fudging and changing the tails and skewness by varying one parameter, the standard deviation of a Gaussian. Such formula is popularly called “Black–Scholes–Merton” owing to an attributed eponymous discovery (though changing the standard deviation parameter is in contra- diction with it). However, we have historical evidence that: (1) the said Black, Scholes and Merton did not invent any formula, just found an argument to make a well known (and used) formula compatible with the economics establishment, by removing the “risk” parameter through “dynamic hedging”, (2) option traders use (and evidently have used since 1902) sophisticated heuristics and tricks more compatible with the previous versions of the formula of Louis Bachelier and Edward O. Thorp (that allow a broad choice of probability distributions) and removed the risk parameter using put-call parity, (3) option traders did not use the Black–Scholes–Merton formula or similar formulas after 1973 but continued their bottom-up heuristics more robust to the high impact rare event. The paper draws on historical trading methods and 19th and early 20th century references ignored by the finance literature. It is time to stop using the wrong designation for option pricing.

See on papers.ssrn.com

23
Giu
12

Moral Hypocrisy, Power and Social Preferences

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

We show with a laboratory experiment that individuals adjust their moral principles to the situation and to their actions, just as much as they adjust their actions to their principles. We first elicit the individuals’ principles regarding the fairness and unfairness of allocations in three different scenarios (a Dictator game, an Ultimatum game, and a Trust game). One week later, the same individuals are invited to play those same games with monetary compensation. Finally in the same session we elicit again their principles regarding the fairness and unfairness of allocations in the same three scenarios. Our results show that individuals adjust abstract norms to fit the game, their role and the choices they made. First, norms that appear abstract and universal take into account the bargaining power of the two sides. The strong side bends the norm in its favor and the weak side agrees : Stated fairness is a compromise with power. Second, in most situations, individuals adjust the range of fair shares after playing the game for real money compared with their initial statement. Third, the discrepancy between hypothetical and real behavior is larger in games where real choices have no strategic consequence (Dictator game and second mover in Trust game) than in those where they do (Ultimatum game). Finally the adjustment of principles to actions is mainly the fact of individuals who behave more selfishly and who have a stronger bargaining power. The moral hypocrisy displayed (measured by the discrepancy between statements and actions chosen followed by an adjustment of principles to actions) appears produced by the attempt, not necessarily conscious, to strike a balance between self-image and immediate convenience.

ftp://ftp.gate.cnrs.fr/RePEc/2012/1216.pdf

See on econpapers.repec.org

23
Giu
12

Epistemology and Fourth Order Consciousness – Interview with Robert Kegan

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

Humanitarian Robert Kegan speaks to What is Enlightenment? Magazine about epistemology, the subject object relationship and the urgent need for humanity to evolve to meet the demands of our accelerating world.

See on www.enlightennext.org

23
Giu
12

Measuring Risk Aversion with Lists: A New Bias

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

Various experimental procedures aimed at measuring individual risk aversion involve a list of pairs of alternative prospects. We first study the widely used method by Holt and Laury (2002), for which we find that the removal of some items from the lists yields a systematic decrease in risk aversion. This bias is quite distinct from other confounds that have been previously observed in the use of the Holt and Laury method. It may be related to empirical phenomena and theoretical developments where better prospects increase risk aversion. Nevertheless, we have also found that the more recent elicitation method due to Abdellaoui et al. (2011), also based on lists, does not display any statistically significant bias when the corresponding items of the list are removed. Our results suggest that methods other than the popular Holt and Laury one may be preferable for the measurement of risk aversion.

See on www.econ.ucdavis.edu




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