Archivio per gennaio 2014

31
Gen
14

Dilbert Does Behavioral Economics

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

The Dilbert comic strip offers a case study on common behavioral biases.

See on psychologytoday.com

Annunci
31
Gen
14

Dilbert Does Behavioral Economics

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

The Dilbert comic strip offers a case study on common behavioral biases.

See on www.psychologytoday.com

31
Gen
14

Communication and the Emergence of Collective Behavior in Living Organisms: A Quantum Approach

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond
Abstract

Intermolecular interactions within living organisms have been found to occur not as individual independent events but as a part of a collective array of interconnected events. The problem of the emergence of this collective dynamics and of the correlated biocommunication therefore arises. In the present paper we review the proposals given within the paradigm of modern molecular biology and those given by some holistic approaches to biology. In recent times, the collective behavior of ensembles of microscopic units (atoms/molecules) has been addressed in the conceptual framework of Quantum Field Theory. The possibility of producing physical states where all the components of the ensemble move in unison has been recognized. In such cases, electromagnetic fields trapped within the ensemble appear. In the present paper we present a scheme based on Quantum Field Theory where molecules are able to move in phase-correlated unison among them and with a self-produced electromagnetic field. Experimental corroboration of this scheme is presented. Some consequences for future biological developments are discussed.

See on ncbi.nlm.nih.gov

31
Gen
14

Communication and the Emergence of Collective Behavior in Living Organisms: A Quantum Approach

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond
Abstract

Intermolecular interactions within living organisms have been found to occur not as individual independent events but as a part of a collective array of interconnected events. The problem of the emergence of this collective dynamics and of the correlated biocommunication therefore arises. In the present paper we review the proposals given within the paradigm of modern molecular biology and those given by some holistic approaches to biology. In recent times, the collective behavior of ensembles of microscopic units (atoms/molecules) has been addressed in the conceptual framework of Quantum Field Theory. The possibility of producing physical states where all the components of the ensemble move in unison has been recognized. In such cases, electromagnetic fields trapped within the ensemble appear. In the present paper we present a scheme based on Quantum Field Theory where molecules are able to move in phase-correlated unison among them and with a self-produced electromagnetic field. Experimental corroboration of this scheme is presented. Some consequences for future biological developments are discussed.

See on www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov

30
Gen
14

Possibility and Plausibility in Law and Economics by Russell B. Korobkin :: SSRN

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

Abstract:      
The general acceptance won by the behavioral law-and-economics approach to legal analysis raises an important methodological question for law-and-economics scholars. For purposes of deriving policy recommendations, how should the researcher determine whether to assume strict rational choice (RCT) behavior or something more consistent with the behavioral decision theory (BDT) literature, such as bounded rationality or susceptibility to cognitive biases? Although most scholars now are willing to assume that strict rationality is not ubiquitous in the world and not even always the most useful behavioral assumption for purposes of crafting legal scholarship, this does not suggest that the opposite is true. That is, it is almost certainly the case that in many law-relevant situations, many actors evaluate information in a relatively unbiased way, make decisions that maximize their expected utility given available information, and implicitly measure utility in terms of their selfish interest. 

In a submission to the Florida State University Law Review’s symposium issue on Behavioral Analysis of Law, Professor Jonathan Klick, responding to my previously published work on the subject of standard form contracts, implicitly provides two answers to this methodological question. The first response, can be paraphrased as follows: the scientific method should be used to determine whether an RCT-based or BDT-based assumption is empirically accurate in the law-relevant circumstances under consideration. The second response is that, until proven otherwise, researchers should presume that citizens act in accordance with RCT. 

In this rejoinder to Klick, I argue that the first response is unobjectionable but often not helpful for the purposes of legal scholarship, and that the second response should be rejected. Instead, I will argue that the choice between using an RCT-based behavioral assumption and a BDT-based behavioral assumption in law-and-economics analysis should turn on the relative plausibility of competing accounts in light of existing knowledge, which is often incomplete and indeterminate. 

See on papers.ssrn.com

30
Gen
14

Possibility and Plausibility in Law and Economics by Russell B. Korobkin :: SSRN

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

Abstract:      
The general acceptance won by the behavioral law-and-economics approach to legal analysis raises an important methodological question for law-and-economics scholars. For purposes of deriving policy recommendations, how should the researcher determine whether to assume strict rational choice (RCT) behavior or something more consistent with the behavioral decision theory (BDT) literature, such as bounded rationality or susceptibility to cognitive biases? Although most scholars now are willing to assume that strict rationality is not ubiquitous in the world and not even always the most useful behavioral assumption for purposes of crafting legal scholarship, this does not suggest that the opposite is true. That is, it is almost certainly the case that in many law-relevant situations, many actors evaluate information in a relatively unbiased way, make decisions that maximize their expected utility given available information, and implicitly measure utility in terms of their selfish interest. 

In a submission to the Florida State University Law Review’s symposium issue on Behavioral Analysis of Law, Professor Jonathan Klick, responding to my previously published work on the subject of standard form contracts, implicitly provides two answers to this methodological question. The first response, can be paraphrased as follows: the scientific method should be used to determine whether an RCT-based or BDT-based assumption is empirically accurate in the law-relevant circumstances under consideration. The second response is that, until proven otherwise, researchers should presume that citizens act in accordance with RCT. 

In this rejoinder to Klick, I argue that the first response is unobjectionable but often not helpful for the purposes of legal scholarship, and that the second response should be rejected. Instead, I will argue that the choice between using an RCT-based behavioral assumption and a BDT-based behavioral assumption in law-and-economics analysis should turn on the relative plausibility of competing accounts in light of existing knowledge, which is often incomplete and indeterminate. 

 

See on papers.ssrn.com

30
Gen
14

The Problems with Heuristics for Law by Russell B. Korobkin :: SSRN

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

Abstract:      
A large body of evidence, now familiar to the legal community,demonstrates that individual judgment and choice is often driven by heuristic-based reasoning as opposed to the pure optimization approach presumed by rational choice theory. The evidence of heuristic-based reasoning presents several challenges for consequentialist legal scholars who wish to make normative public policy recommendations. First, the fact that actors subject to the legal system often rely on heuristics suggests that their behavior will not always maximize their subjective expected utility, undermining the traditional assumptions of law-and-economics scholarship that private contracts are necessarily Pareto efficient and that legal taxes and subsidies can cause actors to behave in a way that maximizes social efficiency. Second, the fact that the decision makers who create law also rely on heuristics suggests that law will not necessarily maximize the desired ends of lawmakers, whether those ends are the collective good or the utility of favored groups, and that law that attempts to create incentives for certain behaviors might not be properly calibrated to its goal. Parts I and II of this essay describe these two problems that heuristics cause for law, and Part III considers steps that lawmakers can take to mitigate the problems. This essay was prepared for the June 2004 Dahlem Conference on Heuristics and the Law.

See on papers.ssrn.com




Time is real? I think not

gennaio: 2014
L M M G V S D
« Dic   Feb »
 12345
6789101112
13141516171819
20212223242526
2728293031  

Commenti recenti

Inserisci il tuo indirizzo e-mail per iscriverti a questo blog e ricevere notifiche di nuovi messaggi per e-mail.

Segui assieme ad altri 959 follower

Latest Tweets


%d blogger hanno fatto clic su Mi Piace per questo: