Archivio per febbraio 2014



28
Feb
14

The Effect of Behavioral Codes and Gender on Honesty

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

Abstract: We examine the effect of adherence to behavioral codes, as measured by the degree of religiosity, on the level of honesty by conducting under-the-cup die experiments. The findings suggest that behavioral codes, which prohibit lying, offset the monetary incentive to lie. The highest level of honesty is found among young religious females while the lowest is found among secular females. Moreover, when the monetary incentive to lie is removed, the tendency of secular subjects to lie disappears. Given the strict separation between the secular and religious education systems the research findings confirm the importance of education in instilling ethical values.

 
See on econpapers.repec.org

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28
Feb
14

Empirically Informed Regulation (2011)

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

The implications of behavioural economics for law and regulation have been extensively discussed by Professor Cass Sunstein. His paper Empirically Informed Regulation (2011) is a particularly useful overview of the issues involved and we will discuss this in depth during the lecture. The more accessible account Simpler recounts Sunstein’s time as a lead regulator within the Obama Administration.

Key points:

Benefits of incorporating empirical findings into the development of regulation.

Can small inexpensive policy initiatives have large and highly beneficial effects?

See on lawreview.uchicago.edu

28
Feb
14

Empirically Informed Regulation (2011)

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

The implications of behavioural economics for law and regulation have been extensively discussed by Professor Cass Sunstein. His paper Empirically Informed Regulation (2011) is a particularly useful overview of the issues involved and we will discuss this in depth during the lecture. The more accessible account Simpler recounts Sunstein’s time as a lead regulator within the Obama Administration.

Key points:

Benefits of incorporating empirical findings into the development of regulation.

Can small inexpensive policy initiatives have large and highly beneficial effects?

See on lawreview.uchicago.edu

28
Feb
14

Understanding Investor Behavior

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

Discover how some strange human tendencies can play out in the market, posing the question: are we really rational?

Behavioral finance certainly reflects some of the attitudes embedded in the investment system. Behaviorists will argue that investors often behave irrationally, producing inefficient markets and mispriced securities – not to mention opportunities to make money. That may be true for an instant, but consistently uncovering these inefficiencies is a challenge. Questions remain over whether these behavioral finance theories can be used to manage your money effectively and economically. (To continue reading on behavioral finance, see Taking A Chance On Behavioral Finance.)

That said, investors can be their own worst enemies. Trying to out-guess the market doesn’t pay off over the long term. In fact, it often results in quirky, irrational behavior, not to mention a dent in your wealth. Implementing a strategy that is well thought out and sticking to it may help you avoid many of these common investing mistakes.

See on www.investopedia.com

28
Feb
14

Understanding Investor Behavior

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

Discover how some strange human tendencies can play out in the market, posing the question: are we really rational?

Behavioral finance certainly reflects some of the attitudes embedded in the investment system. Behaviorists will argue that investors often behave irrationally, producing inefficient markets and mispriced securities – not to mention opportunities to make money. That may be true for an instant, but consistently uncovering these inefficiencies is a challenge. Questions remain over whether these behavioral finance theories can be used to manage your money effectively and economically. (To continue reading on behavioral finance, see Taking A Chance On Behavioral Finance.)

That said, investors can be their own worst enemies. Trying to out-guess the market doesn’t pay off over the long term. In fact, it often results in quirky, irrational behavior, not to mention a dent in your wealth. Implementing a strategy that is well thought out and sticking to it may help you avoid many of these common investing mistakes.

See on investopedia.com

27
Feb
14

History, Expectations, and Leadership in the Evolution of Social Norms

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

Abstract

We study the evolution of a social norm of “cooperation” in a dynamic environment.Each agent lives for two periods and interacts with agents from the previous and nextgenerations via a coordination game. Social norms emerge as patterns of behaviorthat are stable in part due to agents’ interpretations of private information aboutthe past, influenced by occasional commonly-observed past behaviors. For sufficientlybackward-looking societies, history completely drives equilibrium play, leading to asocial norm of high or low cooperation. In more forward-looking societies, there is apattern of “reversion” whereby play starting with high (low) cooperation reverts towardlower (higher) cooperation. The impact of history can be countered by occasional“prominent” agents, whose actions are visible by all future agents and who can leveragetheir greater visibility to influence expectations of future agents and overturn socialnorms of low cooperation.

See on academia.edu

27
Feb
14

History, Expectations, and Leadership in the Evolution of Social Norms

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

Abstract

We study the evolution of a social norm of “cooperation” in a dynamic environment.Each agent lives for two periods and interacts with agents from the previous and nextgenerations via a coordination game. Social norms emerge as patterns of behaviorthat are stable in part due to agents’ interpretations of private information aboutthe past, influenced by occasional commonly-observed past behaviors. For sufficientlybackward-looking societies, history completely drives equilibrium play, leading to asocial norm of high or low cooperation. In more forward-looking societies, there is apattern of “reversion” whereby play starting with high (low) cooperation reverts towardlower (higher) cooperation. The impact of history can be countered by occasional“prominent” agents, whose actions are visible by all future agents and who can leveragetheir greater visibility to influence expectations of future agents and overturn socialnorms of low cooperation.

See on www.academia.edu




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