Archivio per 13 novembre 2014

13
Nov
14

An Illustrated Book of Bad Arguments

This book is aimed at newcomers to the field of logical reasoning, particularly those who, to borrow a phrase from Pascal, are so made that they understand best through visuals. I have selected a small set of common errors in reasoning and visualized them using memorable illustrations that are supplemented with lots of examples. The hope is that the reader will learn from these pages some of the most common pitfalls in arguments and be able to identify and avoid them in practice.

Source: bookofbadarguments.com

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

13
Nov
14

An Illustrated Book of Bad Arguments

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

This book is aimed at newcomers to the field of logical reasoning, particularly those who, to borrow a phrase from Pascal, are so made that they understand best through visuals. I have selected a small set of common errors in reasoning and visualized them using memorable illustrations that are supplemented with lots of examples. The hope is that the reader will learn from these pages some of the most common pitfalls in arguments and be able to identify and avoid them in practice.

See on bookofbadarguments.com

13
Nov
14

Mind Machines

Behavioural scientist Paul Dolan, artifical intelligence expert Margaret Boden and, live from Paris, philosopher Hubert Dreyfus join forces to confront the mind’s greatest metaphor.

Source: iai.tv

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

13
Nov
14

Mind Machines

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

Behavioural scientist Paul Dolan, artifical intelligence expert Margaret Boden and, live from Paris, philosopher Hubert Dreyfus join forces to confront the mind’s greatest metaphor.

See on iai.tv

13
Nov
14

How Humans Behave -Libertarian paternalism is not an oxymoron

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

See on bostonfed.org

13
Nov
14

How Humans Behave -Libertarian paternalism is not an oxymoron

Source: www.bostonfed.org

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

13
Nov
14

The Choice Architecture of Choice Architecture: Toward a Nonpaternalistic Nudge Policy

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond
Abstract

This The goal of nudge policy is generally presented as assisting people in finding their “true” preferences. Supporters argue that nudge policies meet a libertarian paternalism criterion. This claim has provoked complaints that nudge policies are unacceptably paternalistic. This paper suggests that by changing the explicit goal of nudge policy to a goal of making the choice of choice mechanism an explicit decision variable of the subgroup being affected by the nudge one can have a non-paternalistic nudge policy that better fits with the values inherent in Classical liberalism. The goal of non-paternalistic nudge policy is not to achieve a better result as seen by government or by behavioral economists. The goal of non-paternalistic nudge policy is to achieve a better result as seen by the agents being nudged as revealed through their choices of choice mechanisms. Examples are given of how nonpaternalistic nudge policy will and will not differ from paternalistic nudge policy.

See on middlebury.edu

13
Nov
14

The Choice Architecture of Choice Architecture: Toward a Nonpaternalistic Nudge Policy

http://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.middlebury.edu%2Fservices%2Fecon%2Frepec%2Fmdl%2Fancoec%2F0916.pdf&embedded=trueAbstract

This The goal of nudge policy is generally presented as assisting people in finding their “true” preferences. Supporters argue that nudge policies meet a libertarian paternalism criterion. This claim has provoked complaints that nudge policies are unacceptably paternalistic. This paper suggests that by changing the explicit goal of nudge policy to a goal of making the choice of choice mechanism an explicit decision variable of the subgroup being affected by the nudge one can have a non-paternalistic nudge policy that better fits with the values inherent in Classical liberalism. The goal of non-paternalistic nudge policy is not to achieve a better result as seen by government or by behavioral economists. The goal of non-paternalistic nudge policy is to achieve a better result as seen by the agents being nudged as revealed through their choices of choice mechanisms. Examples are given of how nonpaternalistic nudge policy will and will not differ from paternalistic nudge policy.

Source: www.middlebury.edu

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

13
Nov
14

When normative and descriptive diverge: how to bridge the difference

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond
Abstract

Revealed preferences are not consistent. Many anomalies have been found in different contexts. This finding leads to a divergence between normative and descriptive analyses. There are several ways of facing this problem. In this paper we argue in favour of debiasing observed choices in such a way that the “true” preferences are discovered. Our procedure is based on quantitative corrections derived from assuming the descriptive validity of prospect theory and the normative validity of Expected Utility. Those corrective formulas were first applied by Bleichrodt et al. (2001). We explain here how such formulas can be used to avoid inefficient allocation of health care resources. This approach shares the philosophy of Libertarian Paternalism (LP). However, it reduces some of the potential problems of LP: the definition of error (and the need to nudge people) is more clear and objective. In this sense, it reduces the chances that the regulator tries to nudge people toward behaviour based on her preferences and not on subject’s own preferences.

See on upo.es

13
Nov
14

When normative and descriptive diverge: how to bridge the difference

http://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.upo.es%2Fserv%2Fbib%2Fwps%2Fecon1106.pdf&embedded=trueAbstract

Revealed preferences are not consistent. Many anomalies have been found in different contexts. This finding leads to a divergence between normative and descriptive analyses. There are several ways of facing this problem. In this paper we argue in favour of debiasing observed choices in such a way that the “true” preferences are discovered. Our procedure is based on quantitative corrections derived from assuming the descriptive validity of prospect theory and the normative validity of Expected Utility. Those corrective formulas were first applied by Bleichrodt et al. (2001). We explain here how such formulas can be used to avoid inefficient allocation of health care resources. This approach shares the philosophy of Libertarian Paternalism (LP). However, it reduces some of the potential problems of LP: the definition of error (and the need to nudge people) is more clear and objective. In this sense, it reduces the chances that the regulator tries to nudge people toward behaviour based on her preferences and not on subject’s own preferences.

Source: www.upo.es

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond




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