Archivio per 1 dicembre 2014

01
Dic
14

Simplified approval mechanism for social dilemmas

http://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.souken.kochi-tech.ac.jp%2Fseido%2Fwp%2FSDES-2014-7.pdf&embedded=trueAbstract: We develop the simplified approval mechanism (SAM) for n-player public good provision with binary choice. The SAM provides each cooperator a chance to revise his choice when players’ choices are not unanimous. Hence, players can easily retaliate against defection as widely proposed in repeated game theory or conditionally cooperate as observed in voluntary contribution game experiments. The SAM implements the cooperative outcome in backward elimination of weakly dominated strategies (BEWDS). The implementation result also holds in limit logit agent quantal response equilibrium (LAQRE). The average cooperation rate in the SAM experiment is 86.6% across 15 periods, which increases to 96.0% after period 5. Analyzing choice data and responses to the pre-play questionnaires reveals that subjects defect because of free-riding motivations or feelings of uncertainty in others’ cooperation. After observing defections, cooperators switch to defection, which decreases cooperation rates between the first and second stages of each period. 

Source: www.souken.kochi-tech.ac.jp

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

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01
Dic
14

Simplified approval mechanism for social dilemmas

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond
Abstract: We develop the simplified approval mechanism (SAM) for n-player public good provision with binary choice. The SAM provides each cooperator a chance to revise his choice when players’ choices are not unanimous. Hence, players can easily retaliate against defection as widely proposed in repeated game theory or conditionally cooperate as observed in voluntary contribution game experiments. The SAM implements the cooperative outcome in backward elimination of weakly dominated strategies (BEWDS). The implementation result also holds in limit logit agent quantal response equilibrium (LAQRE). The average cooperation rate in the SAM experiment is 86.6% across 15 periods, which increases to 96.0% after period 5. Analyzing choice data and responses to the pre-play questionnaires reveals that subjects defect because of free-riding motivations or feelings of uncertainty in others’ cooperation. After observing defections, cooperators switch to defection, which decreases cooperation rates between the first and second stages of each period. 
See on souken.kochi-tech.ac.jp




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