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One Sided Matching: Choice Selection With Rival Uncertain Outcomes

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond
Abstract: We examine decision making in the context of one sided matching: where individuals simultaneously submit several applications to vacancies, each match has an exogenous probability of forming, but each applicant can only fill one vacancy. In these environments individuals choose among interdependent, rival, uncertain outcomes. We design an experiment that has individuals choose a varying number of interdependent lotteries from a fixed set. We find that: 1) with few choices, subjects make safer and riskier choices, 2) subjects behave in a manner inconsistent with expected utility maximizing behavior. We discuss these findings in the context of college application decisions.
See on econ.ucalgary.ca



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luglio: 2015
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