14
Ago
15

Negative Voters: Electoral Competition with Loss-Aversion

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond
Abstract: This paper studies how voter loss-aversion affects electoral competition in a Downsian setting. Assuming that voters’ reference point is the status quo, we show that loss-aversion has a number of effects. First, there is policy rigidity both parties choose platforms equal to the status quo, regardless of other parameters. Second, that there is a moderation effect when there is policy rigidity, the equilibrium policy outcome is closer to the moderate voters’ ideal point than in the absence of loss-aversion. In a dynamic extension of the model, we consider how parties strategically manipulate the status quo to their advantage, and we find that this increases policy rigidity. Finally, we show that with loss-aversion, incumbents adjust less than challengers to changes in voter preferences. The underlying force is that the status quo works to the advantage of the incumbent. This prediction of asymmetric adjustment is new, and we test it using elections to US state legislatures. The results are as predicted: incumbent parties respond less to shocks in the preferences of the median voter.

http://www.le.ac.uk/economics/research/repec/lec/leecon/dp15-15.pdf 

See on le.ac.uk



Time is real? I think not

agosto: 2015
L M M G V S D
« Lug   Set »
 12
3456789
10111213141516
17181920212223
24252627282930
31  

Commenti recenti

Inserisci il tuo indirizzo e-mail per iscriverti a questo blog e ricevere notifiche di nuovi messaggi per e-mail.

Segui assieme ad altri 833 follower

Latest Tweets

Alessandro Cerboni


%d blogger cliccano Mi Piace per questo: