09
Feb
16

Feasible sets, comparative risk avers… – Maastricht University

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

Feasible sets, comparative risk aversion, and comparative uncertainty aversion in bargaining

Abstract: We study feasible sets of the bargaining problem under two different assumptions the players are subjective expected utility maximizers or the players are Choquet expected utility maximizers. For the latter case, we consider the effects on bargaining solutions when players become more risk averse and when they become more uncertainty averse.

See on pub.maastrichtuniversity.nl



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