Archivio per 2 giugno 2016

02
Giu
16

Remembering Our Past: Functional Neuroanatomy of Recollection of Recent and Very Remote Personal Events

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

Functional magnetic resonance imaging was used to study brain regions implicated in retrieval of memories that are decades old. To probe autobiographical memory, family photographs were selected by confederates without the participant’s involvement, thereby eliminating many of the variables that potentially confounded previous neuroimaging studies. We found that context-rich memories were associated with activity in lingual and precuneus gyri independently of their age. By contrast, retrosplenial cortex was more active for recent events regardless of memory vividness. Hippocampal activation was related to the richness of re-experiencing (vividness) rather than the age of the memory per se. Remote memories were associated with distributed activation along the rostrocaudal axis of the hippocampus whereas activation associated with recent memories was clustered in the anterior portion. This may explain why circumscribed lesions to the hippocampus disproportionately affect recent memories. These findings are incompatible with theories of long-term memory consolidation, and are more easily accommodated by multiple-trace theory, which posits that detailed memories are always dependent on the hippocampus.

See on cercor.oxfordjournals.org

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02
Giu
16

Models of ecological rationality: The recognition heuristic. Goldstein, Daniel G.; Gigerenzer, Gerd

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

Review (see record 2010-04336-001). Due to circumstances that were beyond the control of the authors, the studies reported in “Models of Ecological Rationality: The Recognition Heuristic,” by Daniel G. Goldstein and Gerd Gigerenzer (Psychological Review, 2002, Vol. 109, No. 1, pp. 75-90) overlap with studies reported in “The Recognition Heuristic: How Ignorance Makes Us Smart,” by the same authors (in Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart, 1999, G. Gigerenzer & P. M. Todd, Eds., pp. 37-59, Oxford University Press) and with studies reported in “Inference From Ignorance: The Recognition Heuristic” (D. G. Goldstein, 1998, in Proceedings of the 20th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 407-411, Erlbaum). In addition, Figure 3 in the Psychological Review article (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002) was originally published in the book chapter (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999) and should have carried a note saying that it was used by permission of Oxford University Press.] One view of heuristics is that they are imperfect versions of optimal statistical procedures considered too complicated for ordinary minds to carry out. In contrast, the authors consider heuristics to be adaptive strategies that evolved in tandem with fundamental psychological mechanisms. The recognition heuristic, arguably the most frugal of all heuristics, makes inferences from patterns of missing knowledge. This heuristic exploits a fundamental adaptation of many organisms: the vast, sensitive, and reliable capacity for recognition. The authors specify the conditions under which the recognition heuristic is successful and when it leads to the counter-intuitive less-is-more effect in which less knowledge is better than more for making accurate inferences. (PsycINFO Database Record © 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

See on psycnet.apa.org

02
Giu
16

The Simple Life: New experimental tests of the recognition heuristic

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

The recognition heuristic (RH) is a hypothesized decision strategy that is assumed to enable individuals to make decisions quickly and with minimal effort. To further test this hypothesized strategy, an experiment assessed the proportion of RH-consistent selections when recognition was unconfounded with any other cues (at the group level). This was accomplished by showing participants a fictitious city in the beginning of the experimental procedure, before asking them to decide Whether the previously presented city or a novel fictitious city has the larger population. As hypothesized, people made significantly more RH-consistent selections than chance. Thus, Experiment 1 demonstrated that RH can explain a considerable proportion of participant decisions in a procedure that experimentally excluded alternative interpretations of that behavior. In a second experiment, each participant was given a training session with accuracy feedback. In one group, well-known cities were larger on 80% of trials. In another group, well-known cities were larger on 50% of trials. In a third group, well-known cities were larger on only 20% of trials. On a judgment task later in the procedure, on which there was no feedback, participants from the third group made significantly fewer RH-consistent selections than those in the first two groups. Overall, the present results experimentally remove potential confounds and ambiguities that were present in many prior studies. Specifically, Experiment 1 establishes that people’s choice of recognized over unrecognized objects truly does reflect the use of recognition, rather than other cues; Experiment 2 experimentally demonstrates that learned recognition validity affects the use of recognition, even with a small training sample.

See on journal.sjdm.org

02
Giu
16

Graphs versus numbers: How information format affects risk aversion in gambling

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

In lottery gambling, the common phenomenon of risk aversion shows up as preference of the option with the higher win probability, even if a riskier alternative offers a greater expected value. Because riskier choices would optimize profitability in such cases, the present study investigates the visual format, with which lotteries are conveyed, as potential instrument to modulate risk attitudes. Previous research has shown that enhanced attention to graphical compared to numerical probabilities can increase risk aversion, but evidence for the reverse effect — reduced risk aversion through a graphical display of outcomes — is sparse. We conducted three experiments, in which participants repeatedly selected one of two lotteries. Probabilities and outcomes were either presented numerically or in a graphical format that consisted of pie charts (Experiment 1) or icon arrays (Experiment 2 and 3). Further, expected values were either higher in the safer or in the riskier lottery, or they did not differ between the options. Despite a marked risk aversion in all experiments, our results show that presenting outcomes as graphs can reduce — albeit not eliminate — risk aversion (Experiment 3). Yet, not all formats prove suitable, and non-intuitive outcome graphs can even enhance risk aversion (Experiment 1). Joint analyses of choice proportions and response times (RTs) further uncovered that risk aversion leads to safe choices particularly in fast decisions. This pattern is expressed under graphical probabilities, whereas graphical outcomes can weaken the rapid dominance of risk aversion and the variability over RTs (Experiment 1 and 2). Together, our findings demonstrate the relevance of information format for risky decisions.

See on journal.sjdm.org

02
Giu
16

Brutal Truths

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

As a graduate student at harvard University, I worked with one of the most influential behavioral scientists of all time, B. F. Skinner. Beginning in the summer of 1977, we worked together nearly every day for more than four years, designing experiments and chatting about literature, philosophy, and the latest research. Although we were 50 years apart in age, we were also friends. We saw Star Wars together, had lunch frequently in Harvard Square, and swam in his backyard pool each summer. “Fred” (from Burrhus Frederic) Skinner was the happiest, most creative, most productive person I have ever known. He was also, needless to say, quite smart.

http://drrobertepstein.com/downloads/Epstein-BRUTH_TRUTHS_ABOUT_THE_AGING_BRAIN-DISCOVER-Oct_2012.pdf?lbisphpreq=1

See on drrobertepstein.com

02
Giu
16

The Science of Why We Don’t Believe Science

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

How our brains fool us on climate, creationism, and the vaccine-autism link.

“A MAN WITH A CONVICTION is a hard man to change. Tell him you disagree and he turns away. Show him facts or figures and he questions your sources. Appeal to logic and he fails to see your point.” So wrote the celebrated Stanford University psychologist Leon Festinger (PDF), in a passage that might have been referring to climate change denial—the persistent rejection, on the part of so many Americans today, of what we know about global warming and its human causes. But it was too early for that—this was the 1950s—and Festinger was actually describing a famous case study in psychology. Festinger and several of his colleagues had infiltrated the Seekers, a small Chicago-area cult whose members thought they were communicating with aliens—including one, “Sananda,” who they believed was the astral incarnation of Jesus Christ. The group was led by Dorothy Martin, a Dianetics devotee who transcribed the interstellar messages through automatic writing.

See on motherjones.com

02
Giu
16

Here are 5 infuriating examples of facts making people dumber

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

The notorious “backfire effect” has now been captured in multiple studies.

On Monday, I reported on the latest study to take a bite out of the idea of human rationality. In a paper just published in Pediatrics, Brendan Nyhan of Dartmouth University and his colleagues showed that presenting people with information confirming the safety of vaccines triggered a “backfire effect,” in which people who already distrusted vaccines actually became less likely to say they would vaccinate their kids. Unfortunately, this is hardly the only example of such a frustrating response being documented by researchers. Nyhan and his coauthor, Jason Reifler of the University of Exeter, have captured several others, as have other researchers. Here are some examples:

See on motherjones.com




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