Archivio per 3 giugno 2016



03
Giu
16

Brains creating stories of selves: the neural basis of autobiographical reasoning

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

Abstract Personal identity critically depends on the creation of stories about the self and one’s life. The present study investigates the neural substrates of autobiographical reasoning, a process central to the construction of such narratives. During functional magnetic resonance imaging scanning, participants approached a set of personally significant memories in two different ways: in some trials, they remembered the concrete content of the events (autobiographical remembering), whereas in other trials they reflected on the broader meaning and implications of their memories (autobiographical reasoning). Relative to remembering, autobiographical reasoning recruited a left-lateralized network involved in conceptual processing [including the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), inferior frontal gyrus, middle temporal gyrus and angular gyrus]. The ventral MPFC—an area that may function to generate personal/affective meaning—was not consistently engaged during autobiographical reasoning across participants but, interestingly, the activity of this region was modulated by individual differences in interest and willingness to engage in self-reflection. These findings support the notion that autobiographical reasoning and the construction of personal narratives go beyond mere remembering in that they require deriving meaning and value from past experiences.

See on scan.oxfordjournals.org

Annunci
03
Giu
16

Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics By DANIEL KAHNEMAN

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

https://www.princeton.edu/~kahneman/docs/Publications/Maps_bounded_rationality_DK_2003.pdf

By DANIEL KAHNEMAN

The work cited by the Nobel committee was done jointly with Amos Tversky (1937–1996) during a long and unusually close collaboration. Together, we explored the psychology of intuitive beliefs and choices and examined their bounded rationality. Herbert A. Simon (1955, 1979) had proposed much earlier that decision makers should be viewed as boundedly rational, and had offered a model in which utility maximization was replaced by satisŽ cing. Our research attempted to obtain a map of bounded rationality, by exploring the systematic biases that separate the beliefsthat people have and the choices they make from the optimal beliefs and choices assumed in rational-agent models. The rational-agent model was our starting point and the main source of our null hypotheses, but Tversky and I viewed our research primarily as a contribution to psychology, with a possible contribution to economics as a secondary beneŽ t. We were drawn into the interdisciplinary conversation by economists who hoped that psychology could be a useful source of assumptions for economic theorizing, and indirectly a source of hypotheses for economic research (Richard H. Thaler, 1980, 1991, 1992).

Alessandro Cerboni’s insight:
Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics†

See on princeton.edu




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