Archivio per 4 ottobre 2016

04
Ott
16

Strategic Voting in Multi-Winner Elections with Approval Balloting: A Theory for Large Electorates

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

Abstract: We propose a theory of strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: A fixed number M of candidates are to be elected; each voter votes for as many candidates as she wants; the M candidates with the most votes are elected. We assume that voter preferences are separable and that there exists a tiny probability that any vote might be misrecorded. Best responses involve voting by pairwise comparisons. Two candidates play a critical role: the weakest expected winner and the strongest expected loser. Expected winners are approved if and only if they are preferred to the strongest expected loser and expected losers are approved if and only if they are preferred to the weakest expected winner. At equilibrium, if any, a candidate is elected if and only if he is approved by at least half of the voters. With single-peaked preferences, an equilibrium always exists, in which the first M candidates according to the majority tournament relation are elected. The theory is tested on individual data from the 2011 Regional Government election in Zurich.

See on halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr

04
Ott
16

Elections and deceptions: an experimental study on the behavioral effects of democracy

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

Abstract: Traditionally, the virtue of democratic elections has been seen in their role as means of screening and sanctioning shirking public officials. This paper proposes a novel rationale for elections and political campaigns considering that candidates incur psychological costs of lying, in particular from breaking campaign promises. These non-pecuniary costs imply that campaigns influence subsequent behavior, even in the absence of reputational or image concerns. Our lab experiments reveal that promises are more than cheap talk. They influence the behavior of both voters and their representatives. We observe that the electorate is better off when their leaders are elected democratically rather than being appointed exogenously – but only in the presence of electoral campaigns. In addition, we find that representatives are more likely to serve the public interest when their approval rates are high. Altogether, our results suggest that elections and campaigns confer important benefits beyond their screening and sanctioning functions.

See on econ.uzh.ch

04
Ott
16

EconPapers: Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

By Timothy Feddersen and Wolfgang Pesendorfer; Abstract: We analyze two-candidate elections in which voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that

See on econpapers.repec.org

04
Ott
16

E-Lections: Voting Behavior and the Internet

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

Abstract: This paper analyses the effect of information disseminated by the Internet on voting behavior. We address endogeneity in Internet availability by exploiting regional and technological peculiarities of the preexisting voice telephony network that hinder the roll-out of fixed-line broadband infrastructure for high-speed Internet. We find small negative effects of Internet availability on voter turnout, and no evidence that the Internet systematically benefits single parties. Robustness tests including placebo estimations from the pre-Internet era confirm our results. We relate differences in the Internet effect between national and local elections to a crowding out of national but not local newspapers.

See on ftp.iza.org

04
Ott
16

Bankruptcy and Delinquency in a Model of Unsecured Debt – Working Paper, September 2016, No. 16-12 – Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

This paper documents and interprets two facts central to the dynamics of informal default or “delinquency” on unsecured consumer debt. First, delinquency does not mean a persistent cessation of payment. In particular, we observe that for individuals 60 to 90 days late on payments, 85% make payments during the next quarter that allow them to avoid entering more severe delinquency. Second, many in delinquency (40%) have smaller debt obligations one quarter later. To understand these facts, we develop a theoretically and institutionally plausible model of debt delinquency and bankruptcy. Our model reproduces the dynamics of delinquency and suggests an interpretation of the data in which lenders frequently (in roughly 40% of cases) reset the terms for delinquent borrowers, typically involving partial debt forgiveness, rather than a blanket imposition of the “penalty rates” most unsecured credit contracts specify.

See on richmondfed.org

04
Ott
16

EconPapers: Consumer confidence, the economy, and presidential elections

See on Scoop.itBounded Rationality and Beyond

By Stephen Stanley; Consumer confidence, the economy, and presidential elections

See on econpapers.repec.org




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ottobre: 2016
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