On Narrow Norms and Vague Heuristics A Reply to Kahneman and Tversky

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This reply clarifies what G. Gigerenzers (e.g., 1991. 1994; Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987) critique of the heuristics-and-biases approach to statistical reasoning is and is not about. At issue is the imposition of unnecessarily narrow norms of sound reasoning that are used to diagnose so-called cognitive illusions and the continuing reliance on vague heuristics that explain everything and nothing. D. Kahneman and A. Tversky (1996) incorrectly asserted that Gigerenzer simply claimed that frequency formats make all cognitive illusions disappear. In contrast, Gigerenzer has proposed and tested models that actually predict when frequency judgments are valid and when they are not. The issue is not whether or not. or how often, cognitive illusions disappear. The focus should be rather the construction of detailed models of cognitive processes that explain when and why they disappear.

A postscript responds to Kahneman and Tversky’s (1996) postscript.

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Behavioral Economics, Social Norms, Excessive Drinking and Why Everyone Wants to Be a ‘Face in the Crowd’

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Global Drug Survey runs the biggest drug survey in the world. The results of GDS2014, which received just short of 80,000 responses, (6,500 from the U.S.) were released on April 14. While we have a focus on illicit drugs, we never ignore that most permissive and accepted of drugs – alcohol. So here is the third in a series of little blogs based on the findings of GDS2014 on how people understand their own drinking and how we can use that to reduce alcohol consumption and harm.

One of the most stunning findings from this year’s Global Drug Survey was not only that 45 percent of people were unaware of their country’s drinking guidelines but that on average 1 in 4 people who could be considered as dependent on alcohol (by scoring 20 or more on the World Health Organization’s Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test – AUDIT) thought their drinking was average or less average. In addition, about one-third of this high risk group did not think their drinking placed them at high or extremely high risk of harm. How could it be that a group of predominantly well-educated people whose drinking placed them that a very high risk of harm and in the top 5-10 percent of drinkers in their country could be so “deluded”?

The answer lies in understanding some of common barriers to behavioral change and the way we choose to see ourselves to avoid dissonance and remain internally consistent. The first is that we all tend to overestimate our personal invulnerability to harm. Many smokers will say, “of course smoking kills – other people, not me. I’ve got good genes.” Holding this dangerous, usually inaccurate perception means we are less likely to put things in place to reduce our risk of harm. Another common way of avoiding the need to contemplate the need for change is to look to our friends and those around us (often rather selectively) to reassure ourselves that we are just like everyone else. When it suits us we adopt something called a "normative misperception" (in the case of heavy drinkers, believing your alcohol use is less than average) and it’s a predictor of higher levels of alcohol use. We see examples of this self-serving perceptual bias every day and all of us do it. In the current example, it means heavier drinkers tend to think they are just like everyone else. If you don’t want to think about changing your use of alcohol, thinking it’s neither risky or particularly unusual, it is just the sort of selective evidence you need to make you comfortable in doing nothing. What was amazing was that this “delusional” group of drinkers were the ones most interested in how their drinking compared to others (over 85 percent compared to about 75 percent of everyone else). And that is interesting because it is says they might be open to be influenced by being more aware of what what other people usually do, that is the social norms.

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Behavioral Economics, Social Norms, Excessive Drinking and Why Everyone Wants to Be a ‘Face in the Crowd’

See on Scoop.it – Bounded Rationality and Beyond

Global Drug Survey runs the biggest drug survey in the world. The results of GDS2014, which received just short of 80,000 responses, (6,500 from the U.S.) were released on April 14. While we have a focus on illicit drugs, we never ignore that most permissive and accepted of drugs — alcohol. So here is the third in a series of little blogs based on the findings of GDS2014 on how people understand their own drinking and how we can use that to reduce alcohol consumption and harm.

One of the most stunning findings from this year’s Global Drug Survey was not only that 45 percent of people were unaware of their country’s drinking guidelines but that on average 1 in 4 people who could be considered as dependent on alcohol (by scoring 20 or more on the World Health Organization’s Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test — AUDIT) thought their drinking was average or less average. In addition, about one-third of this high risk group did not think their drinking placed them at high or extremely high risk of harm. How could it be that a group of predominantly well-educated people whose drinking placed them that a very high risk of harm and in the top 5-10 percent of drinkers in their country could be so “deluded”?

The answer lies in understanding some of common barriers to behavioral change and the way we choose to see ourselves to avoid dissonance and remain internally consistent. The first is that we all tend to overestimate our personal invulnerability to harm. Many smokers will say, “of course smoking kills — other people, not me. I’ve got good genes.” Holding this dangerous, usually inaccurate perception means we are less likely to put things in place to reduce our risk of harm. Another common way of avoiding the need to contemplate the need for change is to look to our friends and those around us (often rather selectively) to reassure ourselves that we are just like everyone else. When it suits us we adopt something called a “normative misperception” (in the case of heavy drinkers, believing your alcohol use is less than average) and it’s a predictor of higher levels of alcohol use. We see examples of this self-serving perceptual bias every day and all of us do it. In the current example, it means heavier drinkers tend to think they are just like everyone else. If you don’t want to think about changing your use of alcohol, thinking it’s neither risky or particularly unusual, it is just the sort of selective evidence you need to make you comfortable in doing nothing. What was amazing was that this “delusional” group of drinkers were the ones most interested in how their drinking compared to others (over 85 percent compared to about 75 percent of everyone else). And that is interesting because it is says they might be open to be influenced by being more aware of what what other people usually do, that is the social norms.

See on www.huffingtonpost.com

Amazon.it: Uomini comuni. Polizia tedesca e «soluzione finale» in Polonia – Christopher R. Browning, L. Salvai – Libri

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Amazon.it: Uomini comuni. Polizia tedesca e «soluzione finale» in Polonia – Christopher R. Browning, L. Salvai – Il 13 luglio 1942, gli uomini del Battaglione 101 della Polizia tedesca entrarono nel villaggio polacco di Józefów. Al tramonto, avevano rastrellato 1800 ebrei: ne selezionarono poche centinaia da deportare; gli altri – donne, vecchi e bambini – li uccisero. Erano operai, impiegati, commercianti, arruolati da poco. Uomini comuni che non erano nazisti né fanatici antisemiti, e ciò nonostante sterminarono 1500 vittime in un solo giorno. Un massacro primo di una lunga serie. Alla fine della guerra, rimasero 210 testimonianze di membri del Battaglione 101: come giustificavano il proprio comportamento? E soprattutto, per quale motivo furono così spietatamente efficienti nell’eseguire gli ordini? Per fede nell’autorità, per paura della punizione?

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Amazon.it: Uomini comuni. Polizia tedesca e «soluzione finale» in Polonia – Christopher R. Browning, L. Salvai – Libri

See on Scoop.it – Bounded Rationality and Beyond

Amazon.it: Uomini comuni. Polizia tedesca e «soluzione finale» in Polonia – Christopher R. Browning, L. Salvai – Il 13 luglio 1942, gli uomini del Battaglione 101 della Polizia tedesca entrarono nel villaggio polacco di Józefów. Al tramonto, avevano rastrellato 1800 ebrei: ne selezionarono poche centinaia da deportare; gli altri – donne, vecchi e bambini – li uccisero. Erano operai, impiegati, commercianti, arruolati da poco. Uomini comuni che non erano nazisti né fanatici antisemiti, e ciò nonostante sterminarono 1500 vittime in un solo giorno. Un massacro primo di una lunga serie. Alla fine della guerra, rimasero 210 testimonianze di membri del Battaglione 101: come giustificavano il proprio comportamento? E soprattutto, per quale motivo furono così spietatamente efficienti nell’eseguire gli ordini? Per fede nell’autorità, per paura della punizione?

See on www.amazon.it